1	1	TATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	DIS	IRICT OF DELAWARE
3	IN RE:	. Chapter 7
4	EAM 40 MEADOW LANE, LLC,	. Case No. 22-10293 (BLS)
5	Debtor.	•
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7	IN RE:	. Chapter 7 . Case No. 22-10294 (BLS)
8	EZL 40 MEADOW LANE, LLC	. Courtroom No. 1
9	Debtor.	. 824 Market Street . Wilmington, Delaware 19801
10	Depend.	. Monday, May 2, 2022
11		10:00 a.m.
12	l .	RIPT OF ZOOM HEARING
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRENDAN L. SHANNON UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
14	APPEARANCES:	
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Case 22-10293-BLS Doc 48 Filed 05/16/22 Page 3 of 68	
	3
MOTIONS:	<u>PAGE</u>
Agenda Item 1: Motion of Chapter 7 Trustee for an Order Approving Stipulation Between Chapter 7 Trustee and YH Lex Estates LLC Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 [Filed 4/25/2022; Docket No. 21/15]	3
Court's Ruling:	61
<u>WITNESSES</u>	
WITNESSES CALLED BY THE DEBTORS:	<u>PAGE</u>
GEORGE MILLER	
Direct examination by Mr. Carroll	38
Cross-examination by Ms. Tancredi	42
Cross-examination by Ms. Malik	47
Cross-examination by Mr. Klestadt	51

Transcriptionist's Certificate

(Proceedings commenced at 10:01 a.m.) 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning, all. 3 This is Judge Shannon. I understand from the 4 court reporter that all necessary parties have joined. 5 Before we go any further, can I get a thumbs-up 6 that people are able to see and hear me. All right. I see a 7 lot of thumbs. That's good news on a Monday morning. This is a hearing in the matter of EAM 40 Meadow 8 9 Lane, LLC, a Chapter 7 case. The case number is 22-10293. 10 What I have before me is the trustee's expedited 11 motion for an order approving the stipulation between the trustee and YH Lex Estates. I have received a number of 12 letters to the Court from parties that were filed last week 13 and I have also received the debtor's opposition, which I 14 15 believe was filed on Friday evening, and I've had an opportunity to review that, and I have the debtor's amended 16 agenda or the trustee's amended agenda. 17 18 I will hear first from counsel to the trustee. Good morning, Mr. Carroll. Good to see you. 19 20 MR. CARROLL: Good morning, Your Honor. 21 you. 22 Your Honor, I thought what I might do is just give 23 a brief background and then go from there. What we're 24 dealing with in connection with the two cases is two Delaware

LLCs; the one being EAM 40 Meadow Lane, LLC, which has its

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sole asset -- it has as its sole asset, a residence which was located at 40 Meadow Lane in Southampton, New York, on what was known as Billionaires' Row. That's what I'm going to refer to today as "the property."

The other LLC is EZL 40 Meadow Lane, LLC, and that holds the 95 percent member interest in the other debtor, in the EAM debtor. And a gentleman by the name of Nir Meir owns the other 5 percent of EAM.

With regard to the EZL debtor, there -- it is subject to some dispute as to whether Nir Meir owns 100 percent of the membership interest or his wife, who is Ranee Bartolacci, owns 95 percent and Mr. Meir owns 5 percent.

The trustee, and I think you've probably seen it in some of the letters, Your Honor, has been advised that Justice Cohen, who's presiding over what's been defined as "the proceeding," has ruled that Mr. Meir is estopped from denying that he has the 100 percent membership interest.

What has triggered all this activity is the fact that the property was sold by EAM on April 5th of 2021 for \$42,923,600 and from those sale proceeds, Mr. Meir (indiscernible) certain payment transfers in May, including many different transfers, including two of particular interest, which is \$10,587,387, which was distributed to Ranee Bartolacci, his wife, and \$2 million to Ermitage One, LLC, which is an entity purportedly controlled by

Ms. Bartolacci.

Today, the trustee is seeking approval of a stipulation between himself and an entity by the name of "YH Lex Estates, LLC," which is intended to prevent the further dissipation of sale proceeds and to recapture the same so they can be administered by the bankruptcy estates. YH Lex Estates, LLC, which is the counterparty to the stipulation is a judgment creditor of Nir Meir, holding a judgment for some \$20 million and has engaged in extensive discovery surrounding execution in an effort to recover on his \$20 million judgment; however, I want to point out to the Court that YH Lex Estates is not presently a creditor of the bankruptcy estate.

So, with that background, I just want to run through the stipulation to outline what it does provide and what it does not provide. At its core, the stipulation provides that a special proceeding by YH Lex Estates scheduled for trial this Tuesday, tomorrow, could be remanded from the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York, where it had been removed by Mr. Meir, back to the Supreme Court of New York. That underlying proceeding seeks multiple types of relief. It seeks turnover of certain assets, it seeks an accounting, and it also seeks, basically, a determination of fraudulent conveyance, with respect to payments, which were made to Ms. Bartolacci and to

Ermitage One. They seek to avoid that transfer. Those sale proceeds that came from the property of EAM to Ms. Bartolacci and Ermitage One, and it seeks that as a fraudulent conveyance, an independent action that the creditor would hold on YH.

Now, what does the stipulation provide for benefit of the estates? It actually provides a lot. It resolves the issue that any recoveries by YH for Bartolacci or Ermitage resulting from the special proceeding are property of the estate of EAM. So, it resolves that issue.

It resolves that many (audio interference) with respect to the proceeding, will be held by the estate of EAM by the trustee and that they'll be distributed in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme under 726.

It resolves in Section 4 that any compromise or settlement of the proceeding or the judgment entered in the proceeding is subject to approval, not only of the trustee, but also of the Bankruptcy Court. It contains, also in Section 4, a recognition of the trustee's right to intervene in that special proceeding. It also provides that YH agrees to assist the trustee in reviewing claims asserted against the debtors in the bankruptcy case and to provide background knowledge and information regarding each claim asserted.

It provides the benefit of an imminent trial to prevent the continuing passage of time which will enable

dissipation and spending of EAM's sale proceeds.

Now, having received all that benefit to the estate, what did the estate give up in the stipulation?

Candidly, I think they gave up very little. They gave up the stay and the ability to transfer the special proceeding to this court for a trial down the road. It should be noted on the form that a jury trial had been demanded in connection with that proceeding. It also had the estate, to the extent that YH made recoveries from Bartolacci or Ermitage, the trustee consented to YH being granted a claim pursuant to 503(b) for a substantial contribution; however, it should be noted that that's subject to an application by YH upon approval by the Court -- by the Bankruptcy Court. And the trustee reserved the right to review and object to reasonableness of the amount.

So, the trustee in that provision is merely consenting that he would not oppose the 503(b) in the event that money is brought into the estate, but it is still subject to application and the Bankruptcy Court's approval.

THE COURT: Mr. Carroll, if I can, while you're on the terms of the stipulation, at paragraphs 49 through, I think, 54 of the debtor's response in opposition that was filed over the weekend, there is a concern expressed about the trustee's ability to anoint Mister, or YH with standing. And I'm looking at, I think, specifically, paragraph 7 of the

stipulation, and I just want to make sure I understand.

The stipulation provides that the trustee consents, but if I were to approve the stipulation, I don't read this -- and I'd like clarification from the trustee -- I do not read this to mean that I have provided or granted standing to YH. That would be the subject of a further proceeding. What YH has and what the estate has is an understanding that Mr. Miller would not object to that sort of a request.

Do I understand that correctly, Mr. Carroll?

MR. CARROLL: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARROLL: I believe it indicates that in that Section 7 of the stipulation, it's a mere consent and it actually indicates that others may object to that standing and that the trustee would support the efforts to get standing, but it's still subject to the Court's approval and objection by other parties.

THE COURT: So noted. You may proceed. Sorry for the interruption.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, the estate also agreed that provided that if there are any recoveries in the proceeding or on account of enforcement of the judgment comes out of that proceeding from Bartolacci or Ermitage, and that those funds are turned over to the trustee as property of the

estate, that once the trustee has completed distribution of those funds to EAM's creditors who hold allowed claims, then the trustee agreed to make a distribution to YH as the sole economic interest holder of EZL's interests in EAM.

Now, what should be noted is that it provides that it's pursuant to and to the extent of the Meir judgment and a charging order, again, very similar to the last provision that we were just talking about, to which the trustee consents, but there would still need to be that charging order that would be in place, and the trustee has agreed that he's consenting with respect to the charging order. As Your Honor is probably aware, the charging order would be, because these are Delaware LLCs, would have to be obtained under Title 6, Chapter 18, Section 18703; that's the methodology for the creditor to be able to basically execute on the distribution interests out of that LLC.

I should also point out in connection with that provision that with respect to the bankruptcy schedules for EZL, there are three claims that are listed. Those same three claims are listed in the schedules of EAM. So, this provision, again, only kicks in once all of the allowed claims have been addressed in EAM and, accordingly, the three claims in EZL would have also, by necessity, have been addressed because they are claims against EAM.

Your Honor, that's basically the recitation (audio

interference) of the stipulation itself. And perhaps you want to hear from other parties at this point, but I was just going to put Mr. Miller on briefly and ask him a few questions concerning the recitation that I just provided, and he would be available for cross-examination if the Court would so desire.

THE COURT: Okay. I think -- thank you,

Mr. Carroll -- I think it would be appropriate to hear from

other parties at this point. And, of course, you'll have an

opportunity to offer Mr. Miller's testimony in support of the

relief that she's seeking today.

But at this point, I think what I'd like to do is hear from counsel to YH and at that point, then, I think the parties that are supportive of the stipulation would then both be heard and everybody would be able to respond to the collection of comments. So, I'll hear from counsel for YH Lex.

MR. KLESTADT: Your Honor, good morning. Tracy Klestadt and Kathleen Aiello of Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, counsel for YH; also, our local counsel, Julia Klein is on the line, as well. Your Honor entered an order granting permission for us to appear *pro hac vice*.

Your Honor, you and I crossed paths while you were in private practice. I think this may be the first time I have had the privilege of appearing before you.

THE COURT: Well, good morning and welcome.

MR. KLESTADT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I have nothing substantive to add to Mr. Carroll's presentation. I believe he cogently and succinctly presented to Your Honor the terms of the stipulation.

I would point out, Your Honor, in terms of the State Court proceeding, that at 2:30 this afternoon, Justice Cohen has scheduled argument on the summary judgment motion. If he does not grant the summary judgment motion, the parties are scheduled to pick a jury tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. So, unless Your Honor denies approval of the stipulation, the State Court proceeding is on track and will proceed in due course today and tomorrow.

Your Honor, it's our position that these bankruptcy filings were engineered as a delay tactic to prevent the State Court trial from going forward. We believe that there are no legitimate creditors of EZL and EAM. The creditors that were listed, Your Honor, substantially all of them were paid at the closing of the sale of the property; for example, the mortgage claim and the claim of one contractor were paid. We believe they were paid in full. And once a claims reconciliation process is undertaken, it will be demonstrated that there are no actual claims of these debtors.

I think, Your Honor, the procedure that we've entered into with the trustee sufficiently protects the interests of the estate and does not rush to justice, if you will, a decision with respect to whether or not there are claims against the estate. We agreed to put proceeds of any recovery into the estate in order to — in order that any estate interests could be protected, but at the same time, allowing the recovery proceedings, if you will, to go forward in an expeditious manner.

We would ask Your Honor to approve the stipulation and, of course, we are available to answer any questions that Your Honor may have.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Klestadt.

Before I turn to any parties in opposition, are there any other parties participating today that would be supportive of the stipulation, that wish to be heard?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Very good. Then I think I would hear first from counsel for the debtors. I believe I have both, correspondence, as well as the formal response that was filed, and I would be happy to hear from counsel.

I see Ms. Tancredi this morning. Good morning. Good to see you.

MS. TANCREDI: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. TANCREDI: It took a while for me to be sure 1 2 that my mute was off. 3 THE COURT: No problem. Thank you. 4 MS. TANCREDI: Yes, I think it is appropriate to 5 talk a little bit about the background of these cases and 6 what is and what is not before the Court. I found it helpful to sort of visualize a diagram of the relationship between 7 EAM, EZL, and their interest holders to sort of frame what 9 the parties' arguments are. 10 THE COURT: Is that the diagram that's on page 4 of your response? 11 12 MS. TANCREDI: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MS. TANCREDI: Yes, Your Honor. 15 So, yes, so EAM formally owned real property that 16 was located in Southampton. It was sold for approximately 17 \$43 million to an unrelated third party. After payment of 18 two mortgagees and lienholders, and there was a reserve for a 19 mechanic's lien, the title company distributed net proceeds 20 of sale, \$2 million to Mr. Meir and \$12.5 million to 21 Ms. Bartolacci and Ermitage. Ermitage is an entity that is 22 100 percent owned by the Ms. Bartolacci. 23 So, to go back to the structure, so EAM is owned 24 95 percent by EZL and 5 percent by Mr. Meir. And then EZL's 25 ownership is disputed. EZL contends that 95 percent of EZL

is owned by Ms. Bartolacci, who is Mr. Meir's wife, and 5 percent by Mr. Meir. And YH, which is trying to collect its judgment against Mr. Meir contends that EZL is owned 100 percent by Mr. Meir.

So, YH wants to claw back about \$12.5 million that Ms. Bartolacci and Ermitage received, but YH's problem in the underlying litigation was that it didn't have any claims against EAM, EZL, Ms. Bartolacci, or Ermitage. So, what they did, in essence, is they built themselves a one-legged tool. They developed a theory that EZL was owned 100 percent by Mr. Meir.

And you heard mention of a ruling of Judge Cohen. There is considerable dispute over what Judge Cohen ruled or didn't rule. That's not before Your Honor, whether it's res judicata or not. It has not been briefed or properly presented, so at this moment, I think we all need to conclude for purposes of this hearing that it is, at best, unknown, but because the debtors also filed bankruptcy schedules under penalty of perjury indicating that Mr. Meir only owns 5 percent of EZL, that's what is before the Court right now.

So, YH's theory is that the sale proceeds did not go from EAM to anybody else, even though EAM was the property owner. Their theory is that it went right from Mr. Meir to his wife and his wife's entity. At the time that these — that the closing occurred, YH did not have a judgment against

Mr. Meir, has no claims against Ms. Bartolacci or Ermitage, and basically, YH was just ignoring the fact that EAM was the proper recipient of sale proceeds and then made a distribution from there.

So, EAM and EZL filed these cases on April 6th, which was less than a month ago. And immediately after the cases were filed, my colleague Matthew Ward and I reached out to Mr. Miller to bring him up to speed on the various suits that were pending, because there's more suits that just YH's suit; there's also litigation identified in the statement of financial affairs that has been brought by HFZ, which is an entity that formerly employed Mr. Meir. There is litigation by a surety bond provider (indiscernible) claims against a surety bond that EAM agreed to indemnify under an indemnity agreement. And there's other litigation that's listed there.

So, we sent the trustee the debtor's formation documents, closing documents about how the proceeds of sale were distributed, pleadings. To the extent that Mr. Meir had bank statements, we sent those.

And Mr. Meir, in the meantime, because he is a party to the YH litigation, he removed that suit from State Court and moved to transfer venue to Delaware. And YH moved to remand and that set up a whole other proceeding in front of New York.

Mr. Ward and I asked the trustee whether he was

going to take a position, you know, remand, transfer of venue, please let us know what your preference is, and we didn't get any answer.

EAM and EZL filed their bankruptcy schedules on April 18th and, again, after they were filed, the debtors asked the trustee what his position would be on the motion to remand and the trustee didn't tell us directly; instead, what we received was, the night before the hearing on the motion to remand, we received a copy of the stipulation from Ms. Bartolacci's counsel that had been filed in the New York case. So, three weeks into the case, before the 341 meeting was held, before the trustee had spoken with Mr. Meir, the trustee signed a stipulation.

And I think Mr. Carroll summarized many provisions of the stipulation, but at least in the copy that I pulled off the docket, I didn't see that it was actually attached to their motion to approve. So, it is like 8 pages long; hopefully, Your Honor has it.

THE COURT: I have it and I have it as Exhibit 1 to the motion. I think it was with the motion when I received it. If there's a snafu on CM/ECF, hopefully, we can -- hopefully, everybody has the stip, so I think we can move forward.

MS. TANCREDI: Yeah, I assumed Your Honor had it and if it's a problem on my mind, I just want to be sure.

THE COURT: No problem. 1 2 MS. TANCREDI: So, yes, so, at the end of the day, 3 what the parties contemplate is that the trustee would turn 4 over a surplus to YH. But these are surplus cases; 5 otherwise, YH would never agree to enter into this stipulation. It would not bear the risks of this litigation 6 and costs without having some ability to recover on the other 7 end. 8 9 And it's the turnover of the surplus, in 10 particular, that is extremely prejudicial to the rights of 11 EAM, because the cause of action belongs to EAM. And then 12 once EAM's creditors are paid --13 THE COURT: But that -- right, but I just want to make sure I understand. I mean, you folks filed a 7, not 14 15 an 11 --MS. TANCREDI: Uh-huh. 16 17 THE COURT: -- which leads to the appointment of 18 Mr. Miller as the trustee, vested with all the authority of a 19 trustee. So, when we talk about those proceeds belong to 20 EAM, it is -- those are proceeds or assets, if any, that would be under his control or authority. 21

And I think, is your concern that he's exceeded his authority or he's made a deal that's unwise or unfavorable?

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MS. TANCREDI: Well, it's a little bit of both.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TANCREDI: It's not just prejudicial to EAM.

It's also prejudicial to the rights of EZL, because if EAM's creditors are paid in full, then EAM would make a distribution to EZL, if EAM determined that it (indiscernible) would then make a distribution, and that distribution would be payable to EZL's members. And so, obviously, this is prejudicial to the rights of the members of EZL.

And as Your Honor has said — or asked, it does exceed what the trustee is allowed to do or not do. Under Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code, it's very, very clear and the case are clear that a surplus is to be returned to the debtor and that's period, full stop. The Bankruptcy Code says nothing about the trustee making a distribution to the debtor's members, entering into a charging order, or having any authority after that point. So, that's one way in which the stipulation exceeds the power of Mr. Miller.

But I think to get to sort of the prejudice here,
I think it's important, again, to consider the context of
this. The debtor's 341 meeting was scheduled for April 28th.
On April 27th, Mr. Meir contacted his counsel -- contacted us
on behalf of the debtor and advised that he was ill and did
not think that he would be able to testify at the April 28th
meeting. So, I advised the Trustee's Office that we had

heard this from the debtor's representative and we asked the trustee if he could assist us with rescheduling the meeting and the trustee said the meeting would go forward, okay.

Mr. Meir provided a doctor's note from his internal medicine physician, which I forwarded to the trustee and the trustee insisted that the meeting would go forward, even though the debtor's representative would not be there. So, on April 28th, Mr. Miller proceeded with the meeting over my objection and I don't know what he conducted and I don't know the extent to which it's relevant to this proceeding, but it was not a 341 meeting, because the debtor's representative was not present. There was no one under oath. The trustee basically read the debtor's schedules and then there were various speeches made by counsel for YH and the trustee, and this went on for about an hour.

And at the end of this exercise, the trustee did not give notice of a rescheduled or continued 341 meeting date. And then to my surprise on Saturday, the trustee filed minutes with the Court stating that the 341 meeting had been concluded when, in fact, no 341 meeting had ever occurred.

And the statutory purpose of a 341 meeting is to examine the debtor under oath, and the debtor's participation in a 341 meeting is not optional. In Section 343 of the Bankruptcy Code, it says that the debtor shall appear and submit to examination. Section 341(d) of the Bankruptcy Code

says that the trustee shall orally examine the debtor. And Bankruptcy Rule 2003(b)(1) says that the business of the meeting shall include the examination of the debtor under oath.

The debtor (sic) can't skirt the requirement that he examined the debtor under oath. And there's only one circumstance in the Bankruptcy Code where a debtor is not required to testify and that's under Section 360 -- I'm sorry -- 341(e), where a Chapter 11 debtor has filed its plan and has solicited acceptances prior to the case. So, that's clearly not this case.

And then there are various cases excusing a debtor from participating, but those are decided under Section 105  $^{--}$ 

THE COURT: Well, the matter that I want to make sure that we're talking — I mean, if this is to demonstrate that perhaps, as I think you put in your papers, Mr. Miller is rushing to a deal, I get that. I'm not being asked today to accord any relief or reschedule or reset a 341 at this point, anyway, and I have not seen minutes that were, I guess, filed on Saturday. I did not review the docket, other than to see the agenda and your objections that that were filed.

You're not asking me to reopen a 341 today, right?

MS. TANCREDI: No, I'm not asking for that, but I

am anticipating, based upon some correspondence that I received, that there may be an attempt to establish some sort of effect of a 341 meeting having or not having occurred or being concluded. So, I just wanted to get out there that our position is there wasn't a 341 meeting and it certainly didn't conclude.

THE COURT: So noted.

MS. TANCREDI: Thank you.

So, the trustee has the burden of proof to show that the stipulation should be approved. He has to show that it's fair and equitable. He has to show that it doesn't exceed his powers under the Bankruptcy Code and last, but not least, the stipulation can't deny the debtors and their members of their constitutional property rights.

And so, for reasons that we have already stated, there's nothing fair or equitable about the stipulation. The stipulation also exceeds the trustee's powers. I had mentioned before that Section 726(a)(6) mandates that any surplus must be returned to the debtor and that this is not negotiable.

The trustee's mandate just does not stop

administering Chapter 7 cases for the benefit of creditors.

I know that's probably 90 percent or more of the cases that

Mr. Miller sees, but these are surplus cases and it is

fundamental, it's even in the U.S. Trustee's handbook, that a

surplus case creates a fiduciary duty of a trustee to the debtor and its members. So, Mr. Miller does owe a fiduciary duty to EAM, EZL, Mr. Meir, and Ms. Bartolacci.

As Mr. Carroll mentioned, these debtors are limited liability companies and under the <u>Bax</u> decision, YH does not have standing to pursue derivative actions on behalf of the LLC. And as mentioned in our papers, EAM, EZL, Mr. Meir, and Ms. Bartolacci have constitutional property rights, and so the extent to which they have a right in property has to be determined by an adversary proceeding. The reason it has to be determined by an adversary proceeding is because it's required under Rule 4001. And adversary proceedings are designed with extra procedural protections that are simply not present in contested matters and certainly not contested matters on shortened noticed.

THE COURT: So, I think I want to understand -- and, Ms. Tancredi, what I may do is ask, perhaps, Mr. Carroll to weigh in, in response -- and I'm not interrupting your presentation. I will return to you. But I want an answer on this question.

As I read the stipulation, and particularly Section 8 of the stipulation, which I think you're focused on, which is the distribution of proceeds or distribution of surplus, your point would be if there's a surplus, that's ours. The trustee has agreed that any surplus could go over

to YH, but I think Mr. Carroll was pretty precise in saying that that is not happening under this order; as a matter of fact, the order, the stipulation is extremely clear that any money would go to be held by the trustee and presumably disbursed by an order of this Court.

Now, your point might be, I don't like the fact that the trustee has agreed to not argue about this, but I am not certain that it is providing for that distribution, or otherwise, today, precluding you from interposing an objection or otherwise being heard, because that money is coming into the estate for distribution under Mr. Miller's powers and this Court's authority.

Mr. Carroll, I think I would like -- I have spoken for a while, but I think you get my drift -- I would like an understanding of your perception. And it may be appropriate to hear from Mr. Klestadt, as well, so that everybody is at least on the same page for purposes of today as to what the stipulation accomplishes and what it is not necessarily doing today. I hope I have been clear.

Mr. Carroll, I would like your thoughts.

MR. CARROLL: Yes, Your Honor. I think you have been clear and I think you've clearly stated that there would be have to be basically a charging order in a proceeding to obtain that charging order.

To make an analogy and to address the issues

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concerning the distribution of surplus to a debtor, I've 1 encountered a number of situations where you may have an attachment of funds that would have otherwise been returnable to the debtor. The trustee would be bound by that attachment order to disburse to that particular party, instead of to the 6 debtor.

That's really the exact same thing that happens here, with respect to a charging order that gets put in place for distributions. And there's going to be -- there would have to be a Chancery Court proceeding, quite frankly, to obtain that charging order.

The only thing we've done is indicated that the trustee is not going to oppose that proceeding. Other parties would have the ability to oppose that proceeding.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carroll.

Mr. Klestadt, I think I offered you the opportunity to weigh in on that precise point and then we'll return to Ms. Tancredi. I'd like your thoughts.

MR. KLESTADT: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

"Number one, it is clear to me that Mr. Meir is

Your Honor, I think it would be helpful, if I may read to you a quote from Justice Cohen on the January 31st hearing on the issue of ownership of EZL and EAM. January 31st -- and this is on the transcript at page 124, line 22, to page 125, line 13, Justice Cohen said, quote:

judicially estopped and equitably estopped from denying 100 percent ownership. He made representations to this Court. He made representations to another Court, both of which led to, in part, favorable rulings in reliance on statements about his 100 percent ownership. So, from Mr. Meir's perspective, who is a party in this case and is clearly subject to this Court's jurisdiction, he may not disclaim ownership. 

So it leaves the question of Ms. Bartolacci's rights. I'm going to make that finding that Mr. Meir is judicially estopped and equitably estopped. I'm not going to issue a turnover order yet because I think that procedurally and from an efficiency perspective, the better way to do this, in part — this part, is, in fact, to convert it to a 5225(b) proceeding to give Ms. Bartolacci a chance to make whatever argument she wants to make.

Again, my comments about the evidence being overwhelming are based on the record I have in front of me."

So, Your Honor, I think the point is that Mr. Meir is estopped from making any arguments that he is entitled to the surplus. Other parties, such as Ms. Bartolacci, may have such arguments.

But I agree with the trustee that we have to come back to Your Honor to impose a charging order. No money is going to leave the trustee's hands, except upon order of the

Court. That's what we agreed to and that's what the trustee has agreed to.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Klestadt.

Ms. Tancredi, you may proceed. I would note that I do not have the transcript from which Mr. Klestadt read. I understand, Ms. Tancredi, your point at the outset that, you know, how you side disputes the significance or consequences of rulings that have been made in the New York Court.

I don't want any uncertainty about it. I am not ruling or commenting or otherwise weighing in. I have a stipulation in front of me. That stipulation references legal proceedings that are pending in another court, but I am not being asked today, I think, to make findings as to what was ruled or who was collaterally estopped at this point.

My question, which I interposed to Mr. Carroll and to Mr. Klestadt, I think has been answered, that suggests that further proceedings in this Court would be required before a distribution of the surplus and I think both of the counsel have confirmed that that's the case. And, again, I understand that there are issues and disagreements both, about the status of the New York litigation and what may happen in the future, but I think it was important to get a little bit of clarity on that, and for that, I appreciate counsel's input.

But I did interrupt you and you may proceed.

MS. TANCREDI: Yes, Your Honor.

And I appreciate the interruption and the clarification because the way I read the stipulation, the stipulation is the charging order. I think it was very carefully drafted and I don't think it was carefully drafted to be clear. I think it was carefully drafted to be ambiguous.

You know, paragraph 8 is titled "Charging Order" and if you read the last, you know, the operative phrase:

Then the trustee shall make the -- the trustee shall make the distribution directly to YH as a party in interest, recognizing YH as the sole economic interest holder of EZL's interests in EAM, pursuant to, and to the extent of the Meir judgment in a charging order to which the trustee consents herein.

THE COURT: Well, to the extent, I don't necessarily disagree with that and to the extent that I was unclear on it, that's why I asked my question. And I think, again, I got a consistent response from both parties to the stipulation about what its effect today is and the expectation that there would be further proceedings in this court or otherwise. So, I appreciate that clarity.

MS. TANCREDI: Thank you. So, I'm not going to rehash the rest of our arguments. Again, I would like to focus on the fact that these are surplus cases and so the

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trustee has a fiduciary duty to the debtors and their
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 2
    members, whoever those members may be.
               And with respect to Ms. Bartolacci, he's wholly
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 4
    abdicated that fiduciary duty.
 5
               THE COURT: Okay.
 6
               MS. TANCREDI: Thank you, Your Honor.
 7
                                  Thank you, Ms. Tancredi.
               THE COURT: Sure.
               I believe that I have received correspondence from
 8
 9
    counsel for Ms. Bartolacci, dated the 26th, and I'm not sure
10
    if counsel is on.
               Is that Mr. Scherling?
11
               MR. SCHERLING: No, Your Honor; I'm counsel to the
12
13
    trustee, as well.
14
               THE COURT: Oh, okay.
15
               All right. Is there anyone today representing
    Ms. Bartolacci in connection with today's proceedings?
16
17
               MS. MALIK: Yes, Your Honor, good morning.
18
               This is Pankaj Malik from YK Law, LLP. My local
19
    counsel, my clients, are still in the process of officially
20
    retaining local counsel --
               THE COURT: No worries at all.
21
22
               MS. MALIK: -- so my (indiscernible) --
23
               THE COURT: No worries at all. I'm happy to hear
          I think I have been pretty consistent throughout my
24
25
    career that, obviously, we take the affiliation with local
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counsel seriously, but we also acknowledge the timing and issues. I am more than happy to hear you today and we're not going to sweat anything about local counsel. I would appreciate your input in today's hearing and I appreciate you coming.

MS. MALIK: Thank you so much, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, I have been representing the interests of Ranee Bartolacci and Ermitage One, LLC in the state court, in the U.S. Southern District Bankruptcy Court of New York in these proceedings since about March 11th or March 12th. My client became a named party in this proceeding in February of this year.

All of this talk about this prior proceeding where Mr. Meir was estopped from claiming anything regarding his ownership of EAM or EZL, they were all against only Mr. Nir Meir. My clients were not named parties in that action, which is why, if you recall the portion of the transcript that Mr. Klestadt was citing from, the Court said it was going to be a conversion; however, he goes on to say that in order to preserve or provide Ms. Bartolacci the opportunity to exercise her due process rights. There would have to be a proceeding commenced against her. She was not a party to the action; she had no notice of all of this that was going on. Her only connection to the prior proceeding against Mr. Meir was the fact that a subpoena was served on her and that was

it. Now, since March, we have been in a defensive position for the first time.

And I just want to -- Ms. Tancredi, I'm not going to duplicate or, you know, reiterate the arguments that she's made; however, to the extent that the background touches upon my clients, I'd just like to expand on that, if I may.

It is our contention that Bartolacci is the 95percent member of debtor EZL 40 Meadow Lane and EZL, in turn,
is the 95-percent member of debtor EAM 40 Meadow Lane.
Bartolacci is also the 100-percent member of Ermitage One,
LLC. And Bartolacci and Ermitage are both parties in
interest in this matter.

In 2013, on Bartolacci's 38th birthday, Mr. Meir, her husband, took her to see the property at 40 Meadow Lane and presented it to her as to be their future marital home. The property was purchased for \$10 million and it was a demolish and knock-down. Over the ensuing, the following three years, a brand new home was constructed on that property. Ms. Bartolacci contributed for over the period from the purchase of the property, through the construction, maintenance, and the eight years until it was sold, approximately \$5 million of her own separate monies to the appreciation and completion of that property.

Ultimately, in April of 2021, the property was sold for \$43 million. It was not until two months after that

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that YH Lex obtained a judgment against her husband, Nir Meir. My client never had any connection with YH Lex or their claims against her husband.

We appeared, we filed answers, we filed pleadings, and then, when the debtors filed for bankruptcy at the remand hearing before Judge Garrity in Southern District Bankruptcy Court of New York, the eve before that hearing, this stipulation was filed on the New York State case's docket. And, when I reviewed it, it raised a lot of troubling concerns for the interests and the rights of my clients. We are here defending our interest and our ownership interest in the proceeds that were distributed to her. And the stipulation provides, amongst other things, that the trustee consented to the remand, that any proceeds or recovery would be paid over to the bankruptcy estate of EAM for distribution in accordance with Section 726 of the bankruptcy code. trustee would consent to YH Lex being granted a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 503(b) for substantial contribution with priority -- giving YH Lex a priority ahead of allowed claims of general unsecured creditors. The trustee would confer YH Lex standing to prosecute claim objections to the extent that the trustee declined to prosecute any claim objection directly.

And then, following distribution to EAM's creditors, the trustee would distribute the balance directly

to YH Lex as a party in interest, recognizing YH Lex as the sole economic interest holder of EZL's interest in EAM.

So the stipulation highlights and acknowledges three vital points. First, any fraudulent conveyance causes of action, including the claims asserted in the turnover action, solely belong to EAM's Chapter 7 estate; second, YH Lex expects there to be a surplus after EAM's creditors are paid in full; and, third, the stipulation is of course conditioned upon the approval of the bankruptcy code.

Based upon all of the arguments made by Ms.

Tancredi, I urge this Court to deny this application and disapprove the stipulation.

You know, Bartolacci owns 95 percent of EZL -before I go into that, I just want to address one point that
both Mr. Carroll and Mr. Klestadt focused on is that the
reason that this is being prosecuted and filed and pushed
through the court on an expedited basis is the fear of the
dissipation of assets. This property, Your Honor, was not
sold two weeks ago, it was sold a year ago. To the extent
that there are any assets remaining, to now rush through and
steamroll over my client's interests in EZL and interest in
the proceeds that she received from the sale of her marital
home is very, highly prejudicial to Bartolacci and Ermitage's
interests in these proceedings.

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question? And --

MS. MALIK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- I'll give Ms. Tancredi an opportunity to respond to the same question after you conclude. What significance, if any, should I attribute to Judge Garrity's decision to remand this back to the state court rather than, say, transferring venue or holding the matter subject to the stay and for further proceedings?

I presume that some of these arguments were made to Judge Garrity in one form or another and he entered the order that said back to state court you go; not to Delaware, not to stay here or anything else. Is there any significance I should attribute to that decision?

MS. MALIK: Well, Your Honor, I am not going to presume what Judge Garrity considered before he issued or rendered his order; however, these arguments were presented to Judge Garrity and, on the date of the hearing, Mr. Carroll advised Judge Garrity that they would be filing a motion to approve the stipulation that afternoon and that they would be filing a motion that they expected to have a hearing on in the next three or four days.

The stipulation and motion were not filed until a few days later, it was not filed that afternoon, and I believe that the Judge felt that it would be before Your Honor before the trial would occur before Justice Cohen based upon what Mr. Carroll recommended. Now, we've got this

situation where my clients are completely bootstrapped 1 because we're preparing for arguments on summary judgment 2 this afternoon, we're preparing for a jury trial this 3 4 morning, and then we have this hearing that really should have occurred last week. And if at that time Your Honor had 6 chosen to disapprove the stipulation, this special proceeding would be stayed so that there can be a due process hearing in 7 this court, which is really what needs to happen before a 9 determination is made as to whose funds these really are. 10 As far as the fiduciary duty and the due process taking-up-private-property arguments, I would reiterate all 11 12 the arguments made so ably by Ms. Tancredi on the record. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Malik. Ms. Tancredi, I think I said I would give you the 14 15 same opportunity to respond. Ms. Malik did respond to the question and it gave me a little bit more procedural context 16 for Judge Garrity's proceeding, but you're welcome to 17 18 respond, and then I'll hear from Mr. Carroll and Mr. Klestadt 19 in response. 20 MS. TANCREDI: So, similar to Ms. Malik, I wouldn't presume to say why Judge Garrity ruled as he ruled, 21 22 and I was also not a party to that hearing --

THE COURT: Okay.

24

25

MS. TANCREDI: -- I was not in attendance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TANCREDI: However, I would observe that his 1 2 ruling does -- I guess, if I'm sitting in his shoes, it does 3 the least amount possible and sort of leaves the decision in 4 your hands. It is a very effective, I guess, punt of the issue so that, you know, when the hearing is before you, you 6 can decide. So I wouldn't attribute personally any 7 significance to it. THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you. 8 9 Mr. Carroll, I think what would make sense right 10 now, you had proposed to present Mr. Miller for some 11 testimony. I assume you have no other witnesses. The 12 stipulation is already in the record as an exhibit to your 13 motion, but other than I just want to make sure. Are there 14 any other parties that expect to call witnesses in connection with this proceeding? 15 (No verbal response) 16 17 THE COURT: Okay, so Mr. Miller would be the only 18 witness. And, Mr. Carroll, if you wish to proceed, you may. 19 MR. CARROLL: Thank you, Your Honor. Before I do that, I just want to make a comment on a few of the 20 21 statements that were made --22 THE COURT: I think -- I thought about that for a 23 second -- I think we're probably better off hearing Mr. Miller. 24

MR. CARROLL: That's fine, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And then I'll give you certainly an
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    opportunity and some leeway in connection with any kind of
    closing arguments to tie it together. You know, I don't need
 3
 4
    the full stem-winders from everybody, but I do --
   procedurally, where we are, I heard from everybody in terms
 5
 6
    of what I think I would treat as openings, we'll get to the
    substance of the matter, and then any further argument people
 7
   have to make I would be happy to entertain, including yours.
 9
               So, with that, Mr. Carroll, you may proceed.
10
               MR. CARROLL: With that, Your Honor, I would call
11
   Mr. George Miller in support of the motion.
12
               THE COURT: All right. Can we swear the witness,
   please?
13
14
               THE CLERK: Raise your right hand. Do you
15
    solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
16
    nothing but the truth, so help you God?
17
          (No verbal response)
18
               THE CLERK: You're mute is on.
               THE COURT: The record reflects Mr. Miller said
19
20
    yes.
               Mr. Miller, you do need to un-mute.
21
22
               THE WITNESS: There I go.
23
               THE COURT: There we go.
24
               THE WITNESS: Now I'm good. I was muted before
25
    and un-muted.
                 I do.
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GEORGE L. MILLER, WITNESS, SWORN
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 2
               THE CLERK: Okay. Please state your name for the
 3
    record and spell it.
 4
               THE WITNESS: George L. Miller, G-e-o-r-g-e L. M-
 5
    i-l-l-e-r.
 6
               THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Miller.
 7
               Mr. Carroll, you may proceed.
               THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honor.
 8
 9
                          DIRECT EXAMINATION
   BY MR. CARROLL:
10
          Mr. Miller, can you please (indiscernible) --
11
               THE COURT: Hang on. Mr. Carroll, when you turn,
12
13
   your microphone is not picking you up.
14
               MR. CARROLL: Can you hear me now.
15
               THE WITNESS: Oh, he's gone.
               THE COURT: Mr. Carroll, did we lose you?
16
17
          (No verbal response)
18
               THE COURT: All right, I'll tell you what we're
19
    going to do. We're going to take just a five-minute break.
   He may have gotten disconnected and we'll reconvene.
20
               Mr. Miller, you remain under oath and, hopefully,
21
22
   we'll get back together in five minutes.
23
               I appreciate everyone's patience. Thank you,
    Counsel.
24
25
          (Recess taken at 10:53 a.m.)
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(Proceedings resumed at 10:59 a.m.)
 1
               THE COURT: Good afternoon, all -- or good morning
 2
 3
           This is Judge Shannon.
    again.
 4
               Can I get a thumbs-up that everybody is able to
 5
   hear me?
 6
               Great. And I do see Mr. Carroll. Welcome back,
 7
    sir.
               MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, I don't know where I
 8
 9
    went, into the netherworld somewhere. I'm back. Thank you.
10
               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Miller, I would remind
    you, sir, that you remain under oath, and I think we were
11
12
    just about to commence the examination.
13
               THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
   BY MR. CARROLL:
14
15
          Mr. Miller, you've been appointed as the Chapter 7
    trustee for the estates of EAM 40 Meadow Lane LLC, and also
16
   EZL 40 Meadow Lane LLC; is that correct?
17
18
          That is correct.
19
          And do you have a copy of the motion of the Chapter 7
20
   trustee for an order approving the stipulation between
   yourself as Chapter 7 trustee and YH Lex Estates LLC pursuant
21
22
   to Rule 9019, which is Docket Item 21; and the subject
23
   stipulation, which was Exhibit 1, which is Documents 21-2; do
24
   you have that before you?
25
          I do.
```

- 1 Q And did you execute that stipulation with YH in your
- 2 | capacity as trustee?
- 3 || A I did.
- 4 | Q And were you on the Zoom hearing today when I recited
- 5 | the background in terms of the stipulation?
- 7 Q And did I accurately recite the terms and your
- 8 understanding of the terms of the stipulation?
- 9 | A Yes, I do.
- 10 Q Okay. And what, in the exercise of your business
- 11 | judgment, is the benefit to the estates in entering into this
- 12 | stipulation?
- 13 A All the money that's collected by -- in the New York
- 14 | litigation would become property of the estate, you know, and
- 15 | as soon as it's collected.
- 16 | Q Okay. And you heard reference in the earlier
- 17 discussions to concerns about dissipation of assets.
- 18 | A Yes.
- 19 Q Is that a concern that you had in connection with these
- 20 estates?
- 21 | A Always in a bankruptcy, especially when something has
- 22 been sold and it's in cash. Cash is easy to, I'm going to
- 23 | say, spend, and there's problems and other matters. So,
- 24 | based on my experience, the quicker you can get a judgment
- 25 and collect the money, the better it is for the estate.

- 1 | Q And, in the exercise of your business judgment, do you
- 2 | believe that the stipulation is in the best interests of
- 3 | these estates?
- 4 | A Absolutely. I collect money and I give very little.
- 5  $\parallel$ Q Have you conducted at any 341 meeting in connection
- 6 | with this case?
- 7 | A I did.
- 8 Q Okay. And I believe you heard reference to the fact
- 9 that a representative of the debtor did not appear at the 341
- 10 | meeting?
- 11 A Yeah, the day before, I got notice that the
- 12 | representative was not coming to the thing. And I received
- 13 | an email from the cosmetic surgeon that he would not be able
- 14 | to make it.
- 15 Q Okay. And, in terms of conducting the 341 meeting, you
- 16 | agreed that you would reschedule with respect to the
- 17 | testimony of the debtor representative --
- 18 | A Yes.
- 19  $\parallel$ Q -- another date?
- 20 A Yes. I concluded the 341 meeting, but I also put on
- 21 | the record that, you know, I will conduct an examination of
- 22 | Mr. Meir, who was presented as the debtors' representative.
- 23 | Q And at that 341 meeting, I believe you outlined what
- 24 | information you had managed to garner thus far concerning
- 25 | these debtors' estates; is that right?

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In addition to the schedules, there was a lot of
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 2
    information and research that I had done, and I had said to
    the attendees what my investigation has incurred, what I
 3
 4
   believed were the assets. I read into the record the
    schedules and the liabilities. The attendees were primarily
   the debtors' counsel and representatives of YH Lex. I don't
 6
   believe there was any other creditors at the meeting.
 7
               MR. CARROLL: I have no other questions, Your
 8
 9
   Honor.
10
               THE COURT: All right. Ms. Tancredi, would you
    like to cross-examine?
11
12
               MS. TANCREDI: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
13
                          CROSS-EXAMINATION
   BY MS. TANCREDI:
14
          Mr. Miller, I'm Lisa Tancredi from Womble Bond
15
   Dickinson and I represent the debtors.
16
17
          I believe that you testified that there was not a
18
    debtor present -- debtor representative present at the 341
19
   meeting; is that correct?
20
   Α
          Correct.
          Did you ever examine Mr. Meir under oath?
21
22
   Α
          No.
23
   Q
          Have you ever spoken with Mr. Meir?
```

Have you ever spoken with Ms. Bartolacci?

24

25

No.

- 1 | A No.
- 2 | Q Did you receive copies of the debtors' operating
- 3 | agreements from the debtors' counsel?
- 4 | A I did.
- $5 \parallel Q$  Did you read them?
- 6 | A I did.
- 7 | Q And, as part of your investigation, did you note that
- 8 | the operating agreement for EZL reflected that EZL is owned
- 9 | 95 percent by Ranee Bartolacci?
- 10 A I think the document speaks for itself, you'd have to
- 11 | show me. I don't recall what it is right now.
- 12 | Q But you did read it?
- 13 A There is a dispute between the operating agreement and
- 14 | what the Court says and I'm not getting involved in all that
- 15 | at this time.
- 16 | Q Okay. And as part of your investigation did you note
- 17 | that the operating agreement for EAM reflects that EAM is
- 18  $\parallel$  owned 95 percent by EZL and five percent by Mr. Meir?
- 19 | A The document speaks for itself, I don't have it in
- 20 | front of me.
- $21 \parallel Q$  Did you review the docket of the litigation with YH and
- 22 Mr. Meir and Ms. Bartolacci and Ermitage?
- 23 | THE COURT: Hang on --
- 24 | THE WITNESS: Which docket?
- 25 THE COURT: -- hang on just a second. This is

Judge Shannon. I want to make sure I understand the
question. Are you asking if he reviewed the docket because I
think your question was phrased, did you review the docket of
the litigation with Mr. Meir or Ms. Bartolacci, et cetera. I
think -- so I'm not sure if you're asking if he's familiar
with the docket or whether or not he met with counsel for
litigants and went over the docket.

I'm not sure if I'm being clear, but I want to make sure I understand what your question was. Sorry.

MS. TANCREDI: My question was intended to be simple. My question was had he actually just reviewed the docket himself of the litigation between YH, Mr. Meir, Ms. Bartolacci, and Ermitage.

THE WITNESS: I did not review the docket, I reviewed the information that was provided by your firm and by Mr. Klestadt's firm, and I read trial transcripts and depositions and things of that nature.

## 18 BY MS. TANCREDI:

- 19 Q And are you aware that neither EAM nor EZL are parties 20 to that litigation?
  - A I believe that's correct, but it is the assets of EAM and EZL that are at risk and to be collected by a third party, and that's why the stipulation gives the assets to me.
- MS. TANCREDI: Your Honor, I move to strike the
  latter part of that testimony, it wasn't responsive; it was a

yes-or-no question.

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9

THE COURT: No, I'm going to allow it. If you want to expand on his understanding of the effect of the stipulation, that's fine, but I think his comment, his concluding comment was his understanding of what the stipulation does.

So, I'll allow it, but, again, I'll give you certainly latitude to cross him further.

MS. TANCREDI: Thank you.

- 10 BY MS. TANCREDI:
- 11 Q Mr. Miller, you made a comment that you received a doctor's note from a cosmetic surgeon; is that correct?
- 13 | A That's correct.
- 14 Q And isn't it correct that I have pointed out to you 15 that Dr. Shapiro, who wrote that note, was actually an
- 16 | internal medical doctor?
- 17 A You sent me an email with no supporting documentation.
- 18 My research all indicated he was a cosmetic surgeon in
- 19 || Florida.
- 20 Q My email had a link to his website that showed that he 21 was an internal medical doctor, did it not?
- 22 A I didn't see internal medical doctor, I saw cosmetic
- 23 | surgery. I did not see internal medical doctor, I saw
- 24 | cosmetic surgery. I didn't look at the link, I relied on
- 25 | what my -- you know, what I found in my own --

- 1 | Q So you didn't read the entire website?
- 2 | A Did I read the entire website? No --
- 3 || 0 No.
- 4 | A -- because I don't know how long it was. It might have
- 5 been like some little comment at the bottom or something, but
- 6 | primarily it's a cosmetic surgery.
- 7  $\mathbb{Q}$  Mr. Miller, it was an entire page and I sent you the
- 8 ||link to it.
- 9 | A Okay.
- 10 | Q And I'm surprised you didn't read.
- 11 A Well, it was a cosmetic --
- 12 || Q Did you review --
- 13 A -- surgery company.
- 14 | Q Did you review the debtors' schedules and statement of
- 15 || financial affairs
- 16 || A I did.
- 17 | Q And do you recall that in EZL's statement of financial
- 18  $\parallel$  affairs in response to Item 28 the debtor indicated that Nir
- 19 Meir has only a five-percent interest in EZL?
- 20 A I don't know if it's 28, but I recall that, that he has
- 21 | a five-percent interest.
- 22 | Q And are you familiar with the Bax decision?
- 23  $\|A\|$  The what decision?
- 24  $\parallel$ Q The Bax decision.
- 25 A No.

- 1 Q Based upon your investigation, is YH a member of the 2 debtors?
- 3 || A No.
- MS. TANCREDI: I don't have any further questions of this witness.
- THE COURT: All right. Ms. Malik, did you wish to ask any questions?
- 8 MS. MALIK: Yes, very briefly, Your Honor.
- 9 | THE COURT: Of course.
- 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION
- 11 | BY MS. MALIK:
- 12 Q Good morning, Mr. Miller. I'm Pankaj Malik; I'm the 13 attorney for the parties in interest Ranee Bartolacci and
- 14 | Ermitage One, LLC.
- Do you acknowledge that EZL is 95 percent -- is the 95-16 percent member of EAM?
- 17 A Well, that's what the bankruptcy schedules and 18 operating statements say.
- 19 Q And do you acknowledge the claims of Ranee Bartolacci 20 that she is 95-percent member of EZL?
- 21 A EZL. I don't think she is of EZL. No, no -- yeah, of
- 22 | EZL. I'm confused between EZL and EAM. I'm sorry, EZL.
- 23 Q No problem.
- 24  $\parallel$ A That's what the operating statements are for EZL.
- 25 | Q And do you acknowledge those claims of Ranee

||Bartolacci?

- 2 | A They're not claims, they're equity security interests.
- 3 Q Okay. And do you agree that you anticipate that there
- 4 | would be a surplus in this Chapter 7 proceeding?
- 5∥A I do not.
- 6 Q And do you agree that as Chapter 7 trustee for EAM and
- 7 | EZL you owe the debtor and their members a fiduciary duty?
- $B \mid A = I$  do and it's protected.
- 9 Q And do you acknowledge as Chapter 7 trustee of EAM and
- 10 | EZL you have the right to intervene in the proceeding by YH
- 11 | Lex against Bartolacci and Ermitage?
- 12 | A Yes, because they're assets of the debtor.
- 13 | Q And do you acknowledge that these bankruptcy
- 14 proceedings are core proceedings and related to the special
- 15 proceeding commenced by YH Lex?
- 16 | A I don't know if it is or not, I'm not a lawyer.
- 17  $\parallel$  Q And when you were involved in the negotiations of the
- 18  $\parallel$  stipulation with YH Lex, did you discuss the stipulation or
- 19 | its contents with Bartolacci or her counsel?
- 20 A Me personally, no, it was all done through counsel.
- 21 | Q Did your counsel discuss it with my office?
- 22 | A I'm not sure. I know it was discussed -- I don't know
- 23  $\parallel$  -- with your office, no, but it was discussed with some
- 24 | lawyer who says he's representing everybody on the member --
- 25 | the member area.

```
Well, isn't it true that your counsel only discussed
 1
    the stipulation with counsel for YH Lex?
 2
 3
          No.
 4
          Isn't it true that the proceeds from the sale of the
 5
   property at 40 Meadow Lane are basically the subject or the
 6
   purpose for which the stipulation was executed?
 7
          Primarily; there may be other assets that are pursued,
   but, primarily, they're the largest part of the assets.
 9
          And isn't it true, if all of Bartolacci's claims are
10
   proven, would you acknowledge that she has a due process
11
    property right to those proceeds?
12
               MR. KLESTADT: Objection.
               THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question.
13
               THE COURT: Hang on. There's an objection
14
15
    interposed.
16
               Mr. Klestadt, what's the basis for the objection?
17
               MR. KLESTADT: Well, two, Your Honor. One, the
18
    question is incomprehensible and, second, it calls for a
19
    legal conclusion by Mr. Miller, who has testified that he's
20
   not a lawyer.
               THE COURT: It does call for a legal conclusion.
21
22
    Ms. Malik, I'll give you an opportunity to rephrase the
23
    question.
24
               MS. MALIK: Thank you. Give me one second, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Take your time, no hurry.
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(Pause)
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 2
   BY MS. MALIK:
          Mr. Miller, I'm going to try to rephrase it.
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 4
    Bartolacci's interest in the proceeds from the sale of 40
   Meadow Lane are proven, would you acknowledge that the
    stipulation seeks to deprive her of her interests in such
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 7
   proceeds?
               MR. KLESTADT: Objection.
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 9
               THE WITNESS: I would pose the opposite.
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               THE COURT: All right, Mr. Miller has answered his
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    question.
12
               THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: No, that's --
               THE WITNESS: Whoever I said it, I can't hear.
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15
    I've got bad ears, so they'll have to speak up louder.
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               THE COURT: Not a problem. I will accept the
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   answer.
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               You may proceed.
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               MS. MALIK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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   BY MS. MALIK:
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          And, Mr. Miller, do you -- withdrawn.
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          Isn't it true that the property in question was sold in
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   April of 2021?
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   Α
          Yes.
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               MS. MALIK: I have no further questions, Your
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Honor.

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2 | THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Carroll -- actually, Mr.

3 | Klestadt, did you have any questions for Mr. Miller?

MR. KLESTADT: Your Honor, just maybe one

question.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. KLESTADT:

- Q Mr. Miller, Ms. Malik asked you -- just asked you a series of questions about what you acknowledge with regard to the proceeds with regard to the causes of action. In fact,
- 11 Mr. Miller, you haven't made any decisions with regard to who
- 12 | may be entitled to the proceeds; isn't that correct?
- 13 A That's correct.
- 14 | Q And isn't it true, Mr. Miller, that your understanding
- 15 | is that the stipulation merely preserves the estates' rights
- 16 in whatever the proceeds and recoveries might be, and then
- 17 any distributions of those proceeds will be subject to
- 18 | further order of the bankruptcy court?
- 19  $\|A\|$  I'd like to correct my testimony that I just gave you.
- 20 | I think I -- I think it's Section 726, that I agreed that the
- 21 distribution would be under 726 of the bankruptcy code, and
- 22 then -- so that means all rights under 726 are preserved, and
- 23 || so the equity security holders would be part of that. If
- 24 ||other pleadings are filed in the future, then they'd be filed
- 25 | in the future, but they haven't been filed and are not part

- of the decision at this point in time.
- 2 | Q But any further distribution of proceeds, your
- 3 understanding is, pursuant to the stipulation, that would be
- 4 subject to further order of the bankruptcy court?
- 5 A That's correct.
- 6 MR. KLESTADT: I have no further questions, Your
- 7 | Honor. Thank you.

- 8 THE COURT: Here's what we'll do. That was a
- 9 | relatively friendly cross. I think what I'll do is allow Mr.
- 10 | Carroll to provide any redirect, and then I would afford an
- 11 | opportunity to both Ms. Tancredi and Ms. Malik an opportunity
- 12 to cross-examine a little further on what Mr. Klestadt may
- 13 | have raised or that Mr. Carroll will raise.
- Mr. Carroll, do you have any redirect?
- MR. CARROLL: No, sir.
- 16 | THE COURT: Ms. Tancredi, did Mr. Miller's
- 17 | testimony and his colloquy with Mr. Klestadt give rise to any
- 18 | redirect that you wish to present? I'm happy to afford you
- 19 | the opportunity.
- 20 MS. TANCREDI: No, Your Honor. I would just
- 21 observe, as you did, that it was a very friendly cross-
- 22 | examination. So, to the extent that the testimony was
- 23 | directed by leading questions, Your Honor can take it for
- 24 | what it's worth.
- 25 | THE COURT: So noted.

Ms. Malik? 1 2 MS. MALIK: Nothing further, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then I think what 4 I'd like is to hear from the parties. 5 Mr. Carroll, I assume the trustee rests, no additional witnesses or testimony? 6 7 MR. CARROLL: That is correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And the parties have 8 9 previously advised that there were no other witnesses, so I 10 think if we can have any kind of brief closings or 11 observations. Again, I think we covered a lot of the 12 waterfront in the openings, which were helpful, because there's a complicated both business and procedural history 13 here and it was helpful to hear from all of the parties, but 14 15 I'd start with Mr. Carroll, then Mr. Klestadt, then Ms. Tancredi, and Ms. Malik. 16 17 So, Mr. Carroll? 18 MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, many of the comments and the questioning which has occurred basically exhibits an 19 20 intrinsic misunderstanding of the purpose of the stipulation. The stipulation was entered into because there was 21 22

The stipulation was entered into because there was an ongoing state court proceeding, which in part had to do with the disposition of sale proceeds, which would have been the asset of EAM. The trustee, as was indicated a moment ago, was acting clearly in the best interests of the estate

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to make sure, to the extent there was a recovery with respect to any of those sale proceedings — they were going nowhere; they weren't going to YH, they were coming to him to run through the bankruptcy estate.

To the extent the parties are making arguments with respect to due process rights, this case is loaded with due process. They have the due process of participating in the state court proceeding, to the extent Ms. Bartolacci wants to participate. She's a party, she's participating there, Ermitage is participating there. The monies flow into the estate as part of the waterfall, there's a claims review process which is provided for in the bankruptcy code. The trustee will review the claims; to the extent there are objections, there will be objections. If there is a surplus based upon any proofs of claim, then it will flow in accordance with 726.

There is the provision within the stipulation that, to the extent there's a charging order that's obtained on an interest which is held, that would have to be an adjudication, that would have be an adjudication that takes place. Again, due process rights would be afforded to the parties who are asserting an interest in those underlying membership interests.

So this is not about denial of due process, this is about an asset protection case where the assets have moved

and it's to put a stop to it at a point in time so that all of the parties can be heard and those rights can be adjudicated.

So it's really amazing to me the parties here, sitting here thinking that their rights are somehow being prejudiced, that's quite to the contrary here.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Klestadt?

MR. KLESTADT: Your Honor, thank you. I think the only observation I would make, Your Honor, is that we have the curious situation here where the debtor who filed the case and who filed schedules under penalty of perjury, listing many creditors, including a potential \$600 million claim of an affiliate, appears to be acknowledging that this is a surplus case. I would just ask Your Honor to take that into account while considering the trustee's business judgment.

I think it's also curious that it's the debtor and only the debtor that is questioning the trustee's business judgment and Ms. Bartolacci, but no creditor, no purported creditor and certainly not YH, which entered into the stipulation, is questioning the business judgment of the trustee. I think the trustee has demonstrated that the stipulation certainly falls above the lower level of

reasonableness or just the standard, I believe in this
District as well, that Your Honor would consider for approval
of the stipulation.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

Ms. Tancredi?

MS. TANCREDI: Yes, Your Honor. I think these issues before you are legal in nature and, while there's a lot of color that has been provided to you by arguments of counsel and by the testimony from Mr. Miller, the issues are legal. And, unfortunately or fortunately, the legal result that should come from the situation before you is not necessarily what is convenient for the trustee.

The stipulation is -- as Mr. Miller said, it's a great deal for the trustee. He doesn't have to do anything. Another party litigates the claim, which belongs to the estate; if they recover anything, they turn it over to Mr. Miller. They get to get their attorneys' fees paid by the estate, which I'll get to in a minute, and then he agrees that he will not contest the charging order.

The problem is that the stipulation is premised upon this case being a surplus case. And while no creditor are questioning the trustee's --

THE COURT: Is it really? I think it's premised on that from Mr. Klestadt's point of view, but if he's

incorrect, he's agreed to an arrangement whereby any funds 1 2 would go, they would be distributed by Mr. Miller in accordance with 726, and I expect Mr. Klestadt has done some 3 4 analysis -- or his client YH has done some analysis and 5 expects that there will be a premium, but what Mr. Miller has 6 done is ensure that the rug doesn't get pulled out from under him, that's how I would read it. 7 MS. TANCREDI: Well, YH would never agree to this 8 9 if it was not a surplus case. 10 THE COURT: I agree with that, but --MS. TANCREDI: So --11 THE COURT: -- but Mr. Miller hasn't predicated 12 13 his deal on that fact -- or on that premise. 14 MS. TANCREDI: Well, nevertheless, I think, for 15 purposes of evaluating the stipulation as it is presented and its contemplation that there will be a surplus and what will 16 happen to the surplus, that that's how we should view it --17 18 THE COURT: Okay. MS. TANCREDI: -- just for this context. 19 20 These debtors are Delaware limited liability 21 companies and, under the Bax decision, YH does not have 22 standing, couldn't be given standing through these bankruptcy

proceedings to pursue an action on behalf of a limited

liability company. And that is a legal question, so why

would the Court approve a stipulation that gives YH standing

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that it otherwise would not have.

We've already discussed he constitutional property rights and I'll defer to Ms. Malik on those since those are largely her clients' claims, but a trustee can't summarily give another party standing.

And let's look at YH is in relationship to these debtors. It's not a creditor. We included it on the bankruptcy schedules because it's in litigation and because of this issue for notice purposes. It's really a creditor of a member and that's just too attenuated to confer a party-in-interest designation to YH. So, as a matter of law, the trustee shouldn't give YH 503(e) relief; he shouldn't give them standing to object to claims.

The stipulation isn't really neutral, as Mr.

Carroll would like the Court to think. Really, Mr. Miller is pressing his thumb on the scale in favor of YH. And I will note that in the stipulation itself there's four pages of recitals that are, frankly, unnecessary, but I'm sure will be provided to other courts elsewhere where the trustee agrees that in -- for example, on page 4, the second-to-last whereas clause, the trustee agrees that in the context of the remand motion the trustee and YH, by and through their respective counsel, have also discussed Bartolacci and Ermitage's apparent disregard for procedural defaults on discovery deadlines set by the Supreme Court, including document

production and deposition deadlines which have not been extended or continued. There's also Mr. Miller's expressed concern about the possible rapid dissipation of liquid assets.

As Ms. Malik said, this sale happened more than a year ago and there are remedies in state court where parties are concerned about the dissipation of estate assets -- or litigation assets. One can obtain injunctive relief before judgment, but that didn't happen here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TANCREDI: So, Your Honor, I would just ask
Your Honor to deny approval of this stipulation. The trustee
has a fiduciary duty to the debtors and to their members, and
a fiduciary duty means that you don't -- at a minimum, that
you don't give away their store. At a minimum, the trustee
should be neutral, and he's not neutral in this stipulation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. TANCREDI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Malik?

MS. MALIK: Thank you, Your Honor.

Just to expand on what Ms. Tancredi stated, the concerning thing is, how can the trustee possibly fulfill his fiduciary duty when he's already structured this deal with YH Lex?

There are representations in the stipulation, as

Ms. Tancredi pointed out, about my clients' alleged defaults 1 on discovery deadlines. I didn't receive a call from Mr. 2 3 Carroll to inquire if any of that was true, if there were any 4 actual deadlines set that we did not comply with. Every 5 single deadline that was set by any court in New York my 6 clients complied with. 7 THE COURT: Well, I think --MS. MALIK: So --8 9 THE COURT: Hang on. I want to make sure that 10 we're singing from the same hymnal. Those are legitimate 11 concerns and I hear you, but what I have is a recital from 12 the parties that does not constitute a finding or an 13 acceptance by the trustee that certain things have happened. 14 It says, "In the context of the remand motion, the trustee and YH have discussed YH's allegations" --15 MS. MALIK: 16 Right. 17 THE COURT: -- which --18 MS. MALIK: And, Your Honor, my point is there were 19 discussions held with YH's counsel, why wasn't a phone call made to my office to discuss those allegations with us? That 20 is not a fulfillment of the trustee's fiduciary duty to the 21 22 debtors' members. A large portion, a huge membership 23 interest is owned by my client. 24 And then, as far as the due process, my client

intends to prove at this trial that she contributed \$5

million to the improvement and the appreciation that led to the creation of these proceeds of her own separate funds that she brought into the marriage, that were not marital funds or marital assets or Meir's funds, who is the judgment debtor.

My client was never a judgment debtor of YH Lex.

And, again, I would reiterate all the arguments made by Ms. Tancredi earlier today and request that this stipulation be disapproved based upon all of the arguments we've stated here today.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. The matter before the Court is the trustee's motion for an order approving the stipulation that the trustee has entered into with YH Lex Estates pursuant to Rule 9019. I will grant that motion and I will overrule the objections that were presented.

In so ruling, I first note that the Court acknowledges this matter has been presented on an expedited basis pursuant to reasons laid out by the trustee in his submission last week. The Court specifically provided that objections could be raised at today's hearing, recognizing the time pressures of the scheduling. And the Court very much appreciates the engagement of counsel objecting and the submission of the response of the debtors in opposition.

This is, as I said a few moments ago, a relatively

complicated procedural and factual scenario, again, presented on an expedited basis, but I would observe that, especially given the development of the record in today's hearing, I do not regard this matter as a close call.

The trustee is appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee for purposes of administering these Chapter 7 cases. The record reflects that the trustee engaged promptly and negotiated with YH, and has come up with a stipulated order presented to this Court that in Mr. Miller's, I think, blunt testimony said there's a benefit that any money from a New York litigation comes into the estate for him to hold and to administer consistent with the code. He found that the stipulation is in the best interests of the estates that he is charged with administering and that he has the opportunity to collect and hold money and has effectively given up very little at this point.

I am sensitive to the concerns expressed by the objectors about the speed with which this was presented and their concerns regarding the sufficiency of Mr. Miller's investigation into this process. But I do believe, consistent with Mr. Carroll's comments, that as a practical matter there is significant process and due process that remains because the stipulation does not provide for monies to be handed over to any party immediately or promptly, but rather to come into the estate for administration by the

trustee under the jurisdiction and supervision of this Court.

So I think that it is an elegant resolution which evaluates and, frankly, balances the trustee's estimation of what would be best for the stakeholders in this case and that is his responsibility. He has noted that, as a practical matter, it is the expectation of the parties that there will be sufficient funds to call this a surplus case. And, as a further observation -- and, again, I think the record is developed here -- any distribution of funds that would be characterized as surplus or otherwise are going to be the subject of proceedings in this Court, I assume, or in another court of competent jurisdiction for purposes of deciding who gets what funds.

So I do believe that this stipulation is squarely within the judgment and discretion that is afforded to a Chapter 7 trustee. I note, as Mr. Klestadt has observed, that the debtors are objecting — or the debtor is objecting here, and the fact of the matter is that the debtor is the entity that chose to put this into a Chapter 7 and place this entity under the control and jurisdiction of the Chapter 7 trustee and this Court. The trustee has made a decision and entered into an agreement consistent with and in furtherance of his statutory du ties and his fiduciary duties, and I am satisfied that he has carried that burden.

The parties' submissions do identify that we're

treating this as a -- it is a settlement under Bankruptcy
Rule 9019 and I look at the four factors. The parties didn't
necessarily really walk through or address the factors here,
but I think that they are certainly implicitly addressed in
today's record and they're laid out with specificity in the
trustee's submission on the 25th of April. And,
specifically, they are factors that courts have typically
used, those factors are not in controversy, but to me, at the
end of the day, the analysis is driven by the standard that
courts have typically applied, which is that a Rule 9019
settlement is going to be considered by a court in light of
the proposition that settlements are favored in bankruptcy
and that a settlement will be approved so long as it rises
above the lowest point on the range of reasonableness.

There is no doubt before me that this settlement certainly exceeds that standard, and I'm satisfied that the record today and Mr. Miller's testimony are sufficient to provide for entry of the stipulation.

Mr. Carroll, I would ask, has the stipulation been -- I know it's on the docket as an attachment, but I would ask that you simply file that under a certification. It will be entered promptly because I am aware that there are proceedings this afternoon in another forum and I would like to have that order -- that stipulation entered so that parties can advise the court in that proceeding today and

tomorrow that in fact the stipulation has been approved and is of record on the docket.

I would ask, are there any question?

MS. TANCREDI: Your Honor, this is Lisa Tancredi.

I do have a couple of questions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TANCREDI: The provisions in the stipulation where the trustee consents to YH having standing to object to claims and consent to YH being able to recover funds from the proceeds as a substantial contribution claim. I just want to clarify that that is merely the trustee's consent and is not binding upon the Court or other parties, and that other parties retain the ability to object.

appreciate your clarification on that point. I think we did address specifically this during the examination and during the hearing to the extent that there was any uncertainty.

And I believe I polled both Mr. Carroll and Mr. Klestadt to confirm that in fact the Court is not granting standing today and the Court is not authorizing any surplus distribution or otherwise or allowing a 503(b) application. The trustee has in his negotiations with YH agreed that he would not oppose those, debtor I believe if any party has standing or authority to participate, then there will be further proceedings and the Court will conduct those proceedings.

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That's my understanding and I am seeing Mr.
   Klestadt nod and I believe I saw Mr. Carroll nod, but I would
   ask that both of you gentlemen just confirm that I got it
   right. I do believe this is precisely what we discussed a
    few moments ago.
               Mr. Klestadt?
               MR. KLESTADT: Your Honor, Tracy Klestadt. Yes,
   that's correct. We would be still required to file an
   application for substantial contribution under Section
    503(b), on notice to all creditors and approval by the Court.
               THE COURT: So noted.
              Mr. Carroll?
              MR. CARROLL: That is correct, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Very good. All right.
              Ms. Tancredi, any other questions?
               MS. TANCREDI: No, Your Honor. Thank you very
   much.
               THE COURT: Sure. All right. Any other parties
   with questions?
          (No verbal response)
               THE COURT: Very good.
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               Again, I appreciate everyone's time this morning.
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   Mr. Carroll, I'll look for that order under certification and
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   we'll have that entered today. Again, I think it would be
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   helpful to the New York court to know that the stip has been
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entered and so there's no slip between the cup and the lip.
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               With that, again, I appreciate everyone's time
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    this morning. We are adjourned.
               COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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          (Proceedings concluded at 11:38 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATION We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of our knowledge and ability. /s/ William J. Garling May 16, 2022 William J. Garling, CET-543 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable /s/ Tracey J. Williams May 16, 2022 Tracey J. Williams, CET-914 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable